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FORCE MAJEURE, VIS MAJOR, IMPOSSIBILITY, AND 




It is a tale as old as time—when the economy thrives, businesses grow, 
and deals are made. Transactional attorneys draw up contracts, affix 
signatures, and give handshakes and felicitations all around. But just as 
Isaac Newton warned us that what goes up, must come down, so too does 
the economy inevitably falter. When this happens, contracts fail—
suppliers fail to deliver goods, businesses lay off workers, and litigators 
circle the carnage like buzzards.1 In the cases where things fall apart 
dramatically, judges must interpret these failed contracts to determine 
what is owed and to whom. 
One recent example of this cycle occurred during the COVID-19 
pandemic of 2020.2 However, this pandemic is far from the first time that 
this cycle of boom and bust has happened.3 To protect business 
transactions and mitigate risk in case of disaster, contract drafters have 
developed several boilerplate clauses, including force majeure clauses.4 
Furthermore, courts in every jurisdiction, including Ohio, have adopted 
methods for interpreting these provisions. In addition, the common law 
doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and vis major give parties 
some grace for nonperformance under certain unforeseen circumstances.5 
While courts have grappled with disasters and broken contracts in the 
past, the COVID-19 pandemic created cataclysmic and unprecedented 
effects for large sectors of the American economy.6 It remains to be seen 
exactly how these doctrines and interpretations will stay consistent or 
change over time as Ohio courts reopen, and the inevitable flood of 
litigation moves through the court system. 
 
 1.  Jeremiah A. Ho, Why Flexibility Matters: Inequality and Contract Pluralism, 18 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L. J. 35, 40 (2018). 
 2.  Andrew A. Schwartz, Contracts and COVID-19, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 48 (2020). 
 3.  See Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco, 521 So. 2d 1234 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (a breach of 
contract dispute resulting from the recession of the early 1980s and the 1979 energy crisis); Great Lakes 
Gas Transmissions Ltd. P’ship v. Essar Steel Minn., LLC, 871 F.Supp.2d 843 (D. Minn. 2012) (a breach 
of contract dispute resulting from the Great Recession of 2008). 
 4.  30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:31 (4th ed. 2020). 
 5.  30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:6 (4th ed. 2020). 
 6.  Lauren Bauer et al., Ten Facts about COVID-19 and the U.S. Economy, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTE (Sept. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/09/FutureShutdowns_Facts_LO_Final.pdf. 
1
Gates: Force Majeure, Vis Major, Impossibility, and Impracticability Und
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
284 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
Optimistically, one could argue that the need for such analysis is 
waning. Throughout the end of 2020 and into 2021, more and more 
pharmaceutical companies have developed COVID-19 vaccines, which 
have and will continue to normalize life. As of February 2021, two 
pharmaceutical companies have developed vaccines (which have 
received emergency authorization) that could be over 90 percent effective 
against COVID-19.7 However, even with approval and distribution of 
vaccines, the aggregated effects of COVID-19 will not disappear 
overnight. Cases about this period of time will likely come to the courts 
for years to come, and it will be critical for courts to develop sound 
interpretative principles. 
This Comment assesses the past, present, and future of force majeure, 
impossibility, impracticability, and related doctrines under Ohio law in 
light of COVID-19. Section II examines the history of these doctrines in 
Ohio courts, as well as the history of the COVID-19 pandemic and certain 
law and economics principles. Section III analyzes how Ohio courts likely 
would apply these doctrines and interpretations (as they currently exist) 
to cases involving breach of contract due to COVID-19, and also how 
they should apply these doctrines and interpretations. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Understanding how Ohio courts might apply different contract 
defenses and excuses for nonperformance in light of the COVID-19 
pandemic requires both an understanding of the impact of COVID-19 on 
businesses in Ohio, and of how Ohio courts have applied these defenses 
and excuses for nonperformance prior to the pandemic. Part A of this 
Section discusses the impact of COVID-19 on businesses in Ohio. Part B 
of this Section explores how Ohio courts have applied various contract 
defenses for nonperformance. Finally, Part C of this Section examines the 
methods that courts and legal scholars have used to determine how to 
distribute the costs of contract breach. 
A. COVID-19 and the Business Landscape in Ohio 
COVID-19 has had a devastating impact on both public health and the 
 
 7.  Carolyn Y. Johnson & Aaron Steckelberg, What You Need to Know About the Moderna and 
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economy, in Ohio8 and around the world.9 The first reported case in Ohio 
was on March 9, 2020,10 and the first reported death was on March 19, 
202011 (although the true first cases and deaths likely happened earlier in 
2020).12 As of February 22, 2021, there have been 821,016 total cases and 
14,351 total deaths from COVID-19 in Ohio.13 
In an effort to “flatten the curve,”14 Governor Mike DeWine and former 
Ohio Department of Health Director Dr. Amy Acton acted swiftly, 
producing dramatic economic consequences.15 From March 23, 2020 to 
April 30, 2020, there was a statewide stay-at-home order that enforced the 
temporary closure of all nonessential businesses.16 Beginning on May 1, 
2020, and continuing throughout the summer and fall, businesses were 
gradually allowed to reopen, as long as they complied with restrictions 
like capacity limitations, social distancing, mask-wearing, and 
sanitization.17 
Determining to what extent the stay-at-home order caused the recession 
that followed, and to what extent a recession would have resulted 
regardless of government action in Ohio and beyond, is outside of the 
scope of this Comment. However, it is undeniable that the COVID-19 
pandemic has resulted in the worst economic downturn that the world has 
 




 9.  Global Economic Prospects, WORLD BANK GROUP (June 2020), 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects. 
 10.  Emily Bamforth, Coronavirus Timeline: How the Coronavirus Spread from Cases in China 
to Ohio in Less than Three Months, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 13, 2020), 
https://www.cleveland.com/news/2020/03/coronavirus-timeline-how-the-coronavirus-spread-from-
cases-in-china-to-ohio-in-less-than-three-months.html. 
 11.  Gabe Rosenberg, Coronavirus in Ohio: State Confirms First Death from COVID-19, WOSU 
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://radio.wosu.org/post/coronavirus-ohio-state-confirms-first-death-covid-19. 
 12.  Rich Exner, State Now Identifies 302 Cases Pre-Dating First Confirmations of Coronavirus 
in Ohio March 9, CLEVELAND.COM (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.cleveland.com/datacentral/2020/06/state-now-identifies-302-cases-pre-dating-first-
confirmations-of-coronavirus-in-ohio-march-9.html. 
 13.  Coronavirus (COVID-19), OHIO DEP'T OF HEALTH (last visited Nov. 29, 2020), 
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/covid-19/home. 
 14.  “Flattening the curve” is a term in public health, coined by Dr. Howard Markel, referring to 
an effort to decrease spikes in the number of infected people who need intensive medical care, so as to 
lessen the burden on healthcare workers. 
 15.  Jennifer Edwards Baker, Can Ohio’s small businesses recover from coronavirus economic 
shutdown? FOX 19 (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.fox19.com/2020/04/07/can-ohios-small-businesses-
recover-coronavirus-economic-shutdown. 
 16.  Amended Director’s Stay-at-Home Order, OHIO DEP'T OF HEALTH (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/static/publicorders/Directors-Stay-At-Home-Order-Amended-04-02-20.pdf. 
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seen since the Great Recession.18 Moreover, the effects of this 
pandemic—both social and in terms of public health—have not been felt 
evenly across all sectors and socioeconomic groups. Although the 
demand for goods19 and housing20 has increased, the overall demand for 
services—including everything from hotels, to air travel, to retail, to 
entertainment—has sharply declined.21 
This is especially apparent in the data on jobs growth, which reflects 
the imbalance between sectors described above.22 By October 2020, the 
total nonagricultural labor force in Ohio was down 6.34 percent from the 
prior year.23 However, broken down by sector, employers involved in the 
production of goods experienced only a 4.2 percent annual decrease in 
employment, while employers involved in the provision of services 
experienced a 6.77 percent annual decrease.24 Furthermore, these changes 
in the aggregate were incredibly sharp. The chart below shows the drastic 
decrease in employment relative to the last business cycle peak in the 
United States, as compared to prior recessions.25 
 
 18.  Gita Gopinath, The Great Lockdown: Worst Economic Downturn Since the Great Depression, 
IMF (Apr. 14, 2020), https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturn-
since-the-great-depression/. 
 19.  This is likely because of the increase of leisure consumption inside the home, rather than in 
the form of services outside the home. See The Pandemic Economy in Seven Numbers, NEW YORK TIMES 
(Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/19/podcasts/the-daily/coronavirus-pandemic-us-
economy-unemployment.html?showTranscript=1. 
 20.  This is likely because of the sharp increase of at-home schooling and at-home work, as well 
as ultra-low interest rates. See id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Ohio Labor Market Information, OHIO DEP'T OF JOB AND FAM. SERVS (Nov. 2020), 
https://ohiolmi.com/Home/page85481/1/size85481/48?page85481=1&size85481=48#. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Fred Dews, Charts of the Week: Impacts of the Coronavirus Recession, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTE (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2020/09/11/charts-of-the-
week-impacts-of-the-coronavirus-recession. 
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These negative economic conditions will likely lead many Ohio 
businesses and individuals to be unable or unwilling to perform their 
contractual obligations. Furthermore, it is possible that contract breaches, 
like the economic downturn itself, will not happen equally across all 
sectors and all types of parties. This Comment discusses the defenses and 
excuses that may allow these parties to escape contract performance in 
the next Part of this Section. 
B. Contract Defenses Generally 
 Contracting parties have historically been afforded several defenses for 
nonperformance of a contract under unusual circumstances. This Part 
focuses on one such defense that can often be found within the contract 
itself, a force majeure clause, and three others that have developed at 
common law, vis major, impossibility, and impracticability. This Part 
outlines how these doctrines have been applied and interpreted under 
Ohio law. 
1. Force Majeure 
The general purpose of a force majeure clause is to excuse 
nonperformance of contractual obligations in light of an unforeseeable 
extraordinary event that would make performance impossible or 
5
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impracticable.26 Different jurisdictions take different approaches to 
interpreting these clauses in litigation, answering questions such as: (1) 
Should a force majeure clause specifically define what constitutes a force 
majeure event? (2) How strictly should foreseeability be interpreted? (3) 
Should courts require that the force majeure event made contract 
performance impossible, or merely impracticable? (4) Can the 
nonperforming party be negligent and still invoke the force majeure 
clause as a defense?27 The common law interpretation of force majeure 
clauses is a relatively new concept for Ohio courts.28 Nevertheless, Ohio 
courts have answered some of these interpretation questions, which are 
outlined below. 
First, courts in different jurisdictions must decide how specifically a 
force majeure clause must define a qualifying event. As with other 
contract provisions, Ohio courts first look to the language of a force 
majeure clause to determine whether it applies in a given situation.29 
Thus, if a contract’s force majeure clause includes an enumerated list of 
specific qualifying events, the clause will be construed narrowly to cover 
only those events listed, as well as events that are sufficiently similar 
under the rule of ejusdem generis.30 Ejusdem generis refers to the 
principle where, if a law lists classes of people or things, that list is used 
to clarify the other items within it.31 For example, if a force majeure clause 
listed “war, abnormal weather conditions, and anything beyond the 
reasonable control of the parties,” ejusdem generis would dictate that the 
catchall may include events similar to war and abnormal weather 
conditions like terrorist attacks or earthquakes but may not include 
dissimilar events like labor strikes or economic downturns.32 
A lack of similarity between the listed force majeure events and the 
actual event at issue was a key factor in an Ohio Court of Common Pleas’ 
analysis of the force majeure clause in Dunaj v. Glassmeyer. In Dunaj, a 
hotel management company sued the owners of two hotels for 
reinstatement of the company as manager of the hotels pursuant to an 
earlier management agreement.33 The management agreement contained 
 
 26.  WILLISTON, supra note 4. 
 27.  Force Majeure State Case Law Summary Chart: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS, Westlaw (database updated October 5, 2020). 
 28.  Haverhill Glen, LLC v. Eric Petroleum Corp., 67 N.E.3d 845, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  United Arab Shipping Co. v. PB Express, Inc., No. 96162, 2011 WL 3860639 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Sept. 1, 2011). 
 31.  Damian McNair, Force Majeure Clauses, DLA PIPER (2011), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2012/06/iforce-majeurei-
clauses/files/forcemajeureclauses/fileattachment/forcemajeureclauses.pdf. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Dunaj v. Glassmeyer, 580 N.E.2d 98, 99 (Ohio C.P. 1990). 
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a force majeure clause, which allowed that nonperformance may be 
excused in the following circumstances: 
When prevented by any ‘force majeure’ cause beyond the reasonable 
control of such party (except financial inability of such party) such as 
strike, lockout, breakdown, accident, compliance with an order or 
regulation of any governmental authority, failure of supply or inability, by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, to obtain supplies, parts or employees 
necessary to perform such obligation, or war or other emergency.34 
The hotel owners argued that the termination of the plaintiff management 
company had been warranted, because the hotel management company 
had not met certain cash flow benchmarks.35 The plaintiff countered that 
the force majeure clause in their management agreement, which listed 
specific events like “fire, war, strikes, and acts of God,” excused their 
inability to meet these goals.36 The qualifying force majeure event, 
according to the plaintiffs, was shifting economic conditions caused by 
increased competition from other hotels.37 The court determined that 
because the force majeure clause had elucidated specific catastrophic 
events, and the increased economic competition was not sufficiently 
similar to any of them,38 the plaintiff’s nonperformance was not 
excused.39 
Alternatively, if the force majeure clause does not list specific events 
and is written broadly, Ohio courts will construe the clause broadly.40 In 
Haverhill Glen, LLC v. Eric Petroleum Corp., lessors of oil and gas rights 
sued the lessee, seeking a declaratory judgment that the lease had expired 
due to the lessee’s non-production.41 The lease contained a force majeure 
clause reading “[w]hen drilling, reworking, production or other operation 
are prevented or delayed by inability to obtain necessary access or 
easements, or by any other cause not reasonably within Lessee’s control, 
this lease shall not terminate because of such prevention or delay.”42 The 
lessee argued that a qualifying force majeure event—the owner of the 
surface rights prohibiting the lessee’s access to the property to extract the 
oil and gas—had caused and thereby excused its nonperformance under 
the contract.43 An Ohio Court of Appeals determined that the catch-all 
 
 34.  Id. at 100. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  In fact, the plaintiffs’ issue was arguably closer to a “financial inability” carve out, also in the 
clause, than to any of the listed qualifying force majeure events. Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Haverhill Glen, LLC v. Eric Petroleum Corp., 67 N.E.3d 845, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). 
 41.  Id. at 848. 
 42.  Id. at 846-847. 
 43.  Id. at 849. 
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phrase “any other cause not reasonably within Lessee’s control” could be 
construed to describe the event in question because of how broadly the 
clause as a whole was written.44 Therefore, the lessee’s nonperformance 
was excused.45 
Second, some jurisdictions consider how foreseeable an event must be 
in order for performance to be avoided under a force majeure clause.46 A 
party’s mistaken assumptions about future events or economic outcomes 
do not excuse non-performance under a force majeure clause in Ohio.47 
To some extent, parties are expected to foresee economic fluctuations and 
downturns and factor them into contract formation.48 
For example, in Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Services, Inc., an 
electricity broker sued a purchaser, seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the force majeure clause in their interchange agreement excused the 
broker’s failure to deliver electrical power.49 The force majeure clause 
specifically excused nonperformance resulting from “any cause or event 
not reasonably within the control of the Party claiming Force Majeure, 
and not attributable solely to such Party's neglect, including but not 
limited to. . . [an] act of God or the public enemies, breakage or accident 
to machinery [or] transmission lines. . .”50 The failure to deliver electricity 
transpired after the broker’s suppliers refused to supply the requisite 
electrical power, and the broker could only find a replacement source at 
an inflated cost.51 The court determined that the inability to purchase a 
commodity at an expected price was not a force majeure event, because 
mere economic hardship could not be considered such an event.52  
Third, courts in different jurisdictions will consider whether the force 
majeure event must make performance impossible or impracticable in 
order to excuse nonperformance.53 Ohio courts have determined that a 
force majeure clause cannot excuse nonperformance merely because 
performance became difficult, burdensome, or economically 
disadvantageous.54 
 
 44.  Id. at 850. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See Watson Laboratories, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1111 (C.D. 
Cal. 2001). 
 47.  Dunaj v. Glassmeyer, 580 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ohio C.P. 1990). 
 48.  Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Services, Inc., 760 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 49.  Id. at 456. 
 50.  Id. at 455. 
 51.  Id.  
 52.  Id. at 457. 
 53.  See Home Devco/Tivoli Isles LLC v. Silver, 26 So.3d 718, 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“[F]orce majeure clauses broader than the scope of impossibility are enforceable under Florida law”); 
but see Sunseri v. Garcia & Maggini Co., 148 A. 81, 82 (Pa. 1929) (holding that Pennsylvania courts 
should only apply force majeure clauses to impossible events). 
 54.  Stand Energy, 760 N.E.2d at 457. 
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For instance, in United Gulf Marine, LLC v. Continental Refining Co., 
a fire occurred at the defendant’s oil refinery, which the defendant argued 
was a force majeure event excusing it from taking truck shipments of 
product from the plaintiff pursuant to their original agreement.55 The 
parties had a force majeure clause in their agreement stating: 
[D]ue to acts of God . . . fires. . . transportation difficulties. . . other 
industrial disturbances, or for any other cause or causes beyond its 
reasonable control, it is agreed that on such party's giving notice and full 
particulars of such force majeure to the other party, the obligations of the 
party giving notice shall be suspended. . . The term force majeure shall not 
apply to those events which merely make it more difficult or costly for 
Seller or Buyer to perform their obligations hereunder.56 
An Ohio Court of Common Pleas determined that the original contract 
had not required that the defendant actually be physically able to process 
the product—the force majeure clause would only excuse performance if 
it became impossible for the defendant to accept shipments of the 
product.57 The defendant’s trucks had not been damaged, so although 
taking new deliveries might have been impractical for the defendant, it 
was not legally impracticable or impossible.58 
Fourth, different jurisdictions have different requirements for how 
faultless the nonperforming party must be in order to invoke a force 
majeure clause. In Ohio, the nonperforming party must prove that the 
force majeure event in question was beyond its control and occurred 
without its fault or negligence.59 In United Gulf Marine, the court 
conceded that the fire damaging the defendant’s oil refinery had been 
beyond the defendant’s control, occurring without its fault or negligence, 
which excused the defendant’s nonperformance notwithstanding the force 
majeure clause.60 
Ohio does not have as well-developed case law in the area of force 
majeure clauses as some other states with a higher volume of business 
litigation, such as New York, or a higher volume of natural disasters, like 
Louisiana or Texas,61 which means that the future development of this 
area can draw inspiration from the laws of other jurisdictions. Other 
jurisdictions and scholars in contract law have considered other important 
 
 55.  United Gulf Marine, LLC v. Continental Refining Co., No. CV 2017 0040, 2018 WL 
10036528 (Ohio C.P. Feb. 27, 2018). 
 56.  Id. at *2. 
 57.  Id. at *5. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Stand Energy, 760 N.E.2d at 457 (the case does not elucidate what the actual cause of the fire 
was, but the fault and negligence of the defendant was not at issue). 
 60.  United Gulf Marine, 2018 WL 10036528. 
 61.  As of November 2020, a search on Westlaw for cases involving force majeure clauses yields 
eleven cases in Ohio, but 49 in New York, forty in Louisiana, and 72 in Texas. 
9
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issues related to the interpretation of force majeure clauses, such as the 
burden of proof,62 the nature of causation between the force majeure event 
and the party’s nonperformance,63 notice requirements for the 
nonperforming party,64 requirements for mitigation efforts,65 and whether 
nonperformance is excused temporarily during the force majeure event or 
permanently. 
From the other rules of construction outlined above, it is likely that 
Ohio courts will primarily utilize the text of the contract itself to interpret 
force majeure clauses in the future. It is unclear how Ohio courts will 
interpret force majeure clauses that do not provide explicit answers to 
litigants’ questions. 
2. Contract Defenses 
In addition to parties contractually protecting themselves from liability 
for breach of contract due to unforeseen or extraordinary events, courts 
will sometimes excuse nonperformance in light of such events regardless 
of whether the contract in question contained a force majeure clause.66 
These defenses include vis major, impossibility, and impracticability. 
Each will be discussed in turn below. 
The most similar common law defense to the force majeure clause is 
vis major, also known as the “act of God” defense.67 Essentially, this 
allows a court to excuse nonperformance due to a force majeure-type 
event, even if the parties did not include a force majeure clause in their 
contracts.68 Accordingly, the vis major defense is very similar to the force 
 
 62.  See Maralex Resources, Inc. v. Gilbreath, 76 P.3d 626 (N.M. 2003) (determining that in New 
Mexico, the burden of proof is on the breaching party to invoke and prove the propriety of using a force 
majeure clause); Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 9 P.3d 1204 (Idaho 2000) (holding the same in 
Idaho). 
 63.  See Oosten v. Hay Haulers Dairy Emp. & Helpers Union, 291 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1955) (holding 
that a force majeure event must be the proximate cause of the breaching party’s nonperformance in 
California); Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 18 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1944) (determining that the 
force majeure event must be the sole proximate cause of nonperformance in Florida). 
 64.  See BAE Sys. Ordinance Sys., Inc. v. El Dorado Chem. Co., Civil No. 1:15-cv-01035, 2016 
WL 10647120 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 27, 2016) (where written notice of breach due to force majeure was 
required in Arkansas); Milford Power Co. v. Alstom Power, Inc., 822 A.2d 196 (Conn. 2003) (notice must 
be timely and specific in Connecticut). 
 65.  See Hewitt v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 426 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. 1968) (holding 
that, under Missouri law, the breaching party could not successfully invoke a force majeure clause because 
the damage from the flood was partially due to its neglect); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allied-General 
Nuclear Services, 731 F.Supp. 850 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (Illinois requires that the breaching party make a bona 
fide effort to shed the restraint that is preventing its performance). 
 66.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS CH. 11, INTRODUCTORY NOTE (AM. LAW. INST. 
1981). 
 67.  18 OHIO JUR. 3D Contracts § 208 (2020). 
 68.  Id. 
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majeure provision but with a few added restrictions.69 While a force 
majeure clause can specify any list of qualifying force majeure events to 
which courts must give effect, Ohio courts will only allow a vis major 
defense if the event in question is purely natural and occurs without 
human cause or intervention.70 Furthermore, the vis major event must be 
truly out of the ordinary, rather than typical natural occurrences like 
fluctuations in weather that are usual for the geographic area (although 
such natural occurrences could theoretically be incorporated into a 
contractual force majeure clause).71 Finally, the vis major event must 
render performance absolutely impossible, such as when the subject of 
the contract is completely destroyed.72 
Next, there is the defense of impossibility. Under Ohio law, 
impossibility is a valid defense for nonperformance if, after the contract 
is entered into, an unforeseeable event arises, rendering performance by 
one of the parties impossible.73 However, performance is not excused 
merely because performance is difficult, dangerous, or onerous.74 In that 
sense, the impossibility defense acts similarly to a force majeure clause 
with its unforeseeability requirement, but it is ascribed to an event by the 
courts rather than by the terms of the contract.75 
Ohio courts have not applied impossibility in the pandemic context, but 
they have recognized when other catastrophic events might make 
performance impossible (or not impossible, as the case may be). For 
instance, during World War II, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio determined that even if war conditions and government 
regulations rendered performance difficult or unprofitable, performance 
could not be considered impossible under the law unless a party truly 
could not perform.76 In other words, the impossibility bar is hard to meet 
even under the most extreme political and economic hardships. However, 
there is one notable exception. One Ohio Court of Appeals ruled that a 
government order may make performance impossible for parties under 
the law, and a court could not enforce a contract requiring parties to break 
 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Fiber Crete Constr. Corp. v. L.W.L. G.P., No. 2-86-24, 1987 WL 19038 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 
13, 1987). 
 71.  Id.  
 72.  D.J. Lavy Constr. Co. v. Jordan, No. 91CA-12, 1992 WL 79622 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 10, 
1992). 
 73.  Truetried Service Co. v. Hager, 691 N.E.2d 1112, 1118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
 74.  State ex rel. Jewett v. Sayre, 109 N.E. 636, 639 (Ohio 1914). 
 75.  Haverhill Glen, LLC v. Eric Petroleum Corp., 67 N.E.3d 845, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). 
 76.  Ohio Citizens Trust Co. v. Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp., 56 F.Supp. 1010, 1017 (N.D. 
Ohio 1944). 
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the law as a matter of public policy.77 
A third common law defense for nonperformance that is closely related 
to impossibility is impracticability. Proving impracticability of 
performance is somewhat less burdensome for the nonperforming party 
than proving impossibility, because the party does not have to prove that 
performance was actually impossible but rather just extremely 
inconvenient or costly.78 Under Ohio contract law, to successfully invoke 
the defense of impracticability, the nonperforming party must show that 
a supervening event occurred, the non-occurrence of which was a basic 
assumption on which the contract was made, and the event rendered 
performance impracticable.79 Ohio courts are split as to whether 
unforeseeability is a prerequisite for impracticability, as it is for 
impossibility.80 Despite the lower standard for the nonperforming party 
for impracticability, impracticability still must mean something more than 
mere impracticality.81 A party must make reasonable efforts to overcome 
obstacles to performance, and performance only becomes impracticable 
when the risk of injury to people or property is disproportionate to the 
ends that performance would bring.82 
C. Law and Economics Principles 
Law and economics principles underpin the defenses outlined above in 
Part B. Law and economics is a somewhat controversial school of 
jurisprudence that borrows from economic theories and applies them to 
the law, either descriptively or normatively.83 Implicitly or explicitly, 
many courts utilize law and economics by subscribing to the efficient 
breach theory of contract law when assessing whether a party may avoid 
performance.84 Under efficient breach, the non-performing promisor will 
 
 77.  Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters, Local 93 of the Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters v. City of 
Cleveland, No. 94631, 2010 WL 4684736 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2010). 
 78.  Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
207, 210 (2009). 
 79.  Bank One, Marion v. Marion, Ohio, Internal Medicine Inc., No. 9-96-69, 1997 WL 176140 
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1997). 
 80.  See Truetried Service Co. v. Hager, 691 N.E.2d 1112, 1118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (where the 
Eighth District held foreseeability to be an element of impracticability), Bank One, 1997 WL 176140 
(where the Third District held foreseeability to be an element of impracticability). The courts following 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts definition of impracticability do not treat foreseeability as an 
element of impracticability. 
 81.  See B-Right Trucking Co. v. Warfab Field Machining and Erection Corp., No. 2000-T-0072, 
2001 WL 1602687 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2001) (“‘[I]mpracticability’ means more than 
‘impracticality.’”). 
 82.  Id. at 5. 
 83.  Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics? 64 MARYLAND L. REV. 303, 
304 (2005). 
 84.  Thomas J. Loeb, Judicial Application of the Efficient Breach Theory: A Critical Examination, 
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breach his or her contractual obligations (and therefore have to invoke 
any of the above defenses) if doing so would make the promisor better off 
and the promisee no worse off (in other words, if doing so would be Pareto 
efficient).85 While this is certainly an accurate description of some 
breaches of contract, it relies on certain assumptions—in particular, that 
both parties are equally sophisticated and rational86—that are simply 
inaccurate, especially during a catastrophic event like the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
The study of law and economics may offer other insights for courts 
seeking to understand how to allocate damages when parties breach their 
contractual obligations. Law and economics is particularly associated 
with the neoclassical Chicago school of economics and with 
deregulation,87 but it has also been utilized by more pro-regulation legal 
scholars, like Cass Sunstein, who updated the field with his consideration 
of behavioral economics and non-rational actors.88 In other words, it is a 
framework that can be utilized by different judges with different judicial 
philosophies to either preserve or move past the efficient breach theory. 
One concept from law and economics that might prove useful is the 
least-cost avoider theory.89 The basic principle of the least-cost avoider, 
which is most commonly applied in torts cases, is that when there is an 
accident which serves as a sunk cost, the party best equipped to mitigate 
the aggregate damage—either before, during, or after the accident—or for 
whom mitigation is less costly should bear the majority of the costs for 
mitigation.90 In the contracts context, when there is a loss for which the 
contracting parties did not provide (like a change in market price or a 
natural disaster), a court can efficiently assign the costs associated with 
that loss to the party who could have mitigated the loss either ex ante or 
post ante.91 This is because many courts want to create default rules that 
will ensure that parties take optimal and effective precautions before they 
wind up in court.92 
Another concept in law and economics relates to opportunism, which 
 
30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 893 (2017). 
 85.  Id. at 893-894. 
 86.  Id. at 896. 
 87.  James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the 
Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 275 (1997). 
 88.  Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997). 
 89.  William Barnett II, Walter Block, and Gene Callahan, The Paradox of Coase as a Defender 
of Free Markets, NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 1075, 1086 (2005). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 941 (1992). 
 92.  Id. at 946. 
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refers to taking advantage of another party’s vulnerability.93 The two key 
vulnerabilities outlined by law and economics scholars are information 
asymmetry (where one or both parties knows considerably less than 
required to make an optimal bargain) and sequential performance (where 
the first moving party who makes non-recoverable investments is at the 
mercy of the second moving party to ensure the value of those 
investments).94 According to theorists, courts should be concerned with 
preventing parties from behaving opportunistically—in other words, from 
acting on information that the other party lacks or from taking advantage 
of a party that already has sunk costs into non-recoverable investments.95 
Although the concept of opportunism is less often applied in courts than 
the concept of least-cost avoiders, opportunism is well-suited to contract 
law as it currently exists. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Contract law as it currently exists in Ohio has not been informed by 
massive disasters. There are very few relevant precedential cases in 
Ohio96 from the 1918 influenza pandemic97 and only a few from the wars 
of the twentieth century.98 In other words, much of the case law in Ohio 
concerns minor emergencies and accidents rather than major 
catastrophes, differing from cases that New York courts had to grapple 
with after the September 11th attacks99 or Louisiana courts after Hurricane 
Katrina.100 Therefore, Ohio’s case law may not present clear models for 
courts to use during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
This Section lays out ways that Ohio courts might treat parties seeking 
to back out of contract performance due to the COVID-19 pandemic. To 
illustrate, this Section will apply Ohio law to a current case in Delaware 
to see how the results might turn out in that scenario. The chosen 
illustration is a high-profile matter from Delaware involving the thwarted 
acquisition of Victoria’s Secret from a struggling L Brands by the buyout 
 
 93.  Id. at 954. 
 94.  Id. at 954-955. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See Montgomery v. Bd. of Educ. Of Liberty Twp., Union Cnty., 131 N.E. 497 (Ohio 1921). 
 97.  Other jurisdictions, and other areas of law, also have case law specifically addressing the 1918 
flu pandemic. See Citrus Soap Co. v. Peet Bros. Mfg. Co., 194 P. 715 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920); Napier 
v. Trace Fork Mining Co., 235 S.W. 766 (Ky. Ct. App. 1921); Sandry v. Brooklyn School Dist. No. 78 of 
Williams Cnty., 182 N.W. 689 (N.D. 1921). 
 98.  See Trimble v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 82 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948). 
 99.  See Bush v. Protravel Intern., Inc., 192 Misc.2d 743 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2002); Lava Trading, Inc. 
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 365 F.Supp.2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 100.  See Lila, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 994 So.2d 139 (La. Ct. App. 2008); View 
West Condominium Ass’n v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., No. 11-20423-CIV, 2011 WL 3704782 (S.D. Fla. 
Aug. 23, 2011). 
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firm Sycamore Partners.101 Part A of this Section will apply Ohio case 
law to the Victoria’s Secret deal gone wrong. Part B of this Section will 
then explore the potential shifts that Ohio contract law could take as a 
normative evolution in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
A. Application of Ohio Law to Contracts During the COVID-19 
Pandemic 
This Part discusses how courts ought to apply Ohio contract law to 
cases arising from the COVID-19 pandemic through the specific 
illustration of the Victoria’s Secret deal. This application will reveal some 
significant inflexibilities in Ohio contract law, which courts may find 
unjust in the pandemic context. First, this Part explains how force majeure 
clauses might be interpreted (most of which would have been written prior 
to the pandemic). Next, this Part will discuss the application of common 
law defenses of vis major, impossibility, and impracticability. 
1. Force Majeure 
In the recent Victoria’s Secret deal, L Brands sought to separate its 
subsidiary Victoria’s Secret and place it in a privately-held company that 
was majority-owned by one of Sycamore Partners’ affiliates.102 The 
parties entered into a transaction agreement on February 20, 2020, which 
provided in part that, prior to closing, L Brands would operate Victoria’s 
Secret “in the ordinary course consistent with past practice.”103 However, 
during the pandemic, L Brands closed almost all Victoria’s Secret stores, 
furloughed employees, and reduced base compensation. This caused 
Sycamore Partners to sue to terminate the deal in Delaware Chancery 
Court due to L Brands’ breach of the Transaction Agreement.104 
However, L Brands had been able to carve out certain excuses for 
nonperformance in the Transaction Agreement’s Material Adverse Effect 
(“MAE”) clause, including “the existence, occurrence or continuation of 
any pandemics . . .”105 
 
 101.  James B. Stewart, The Victoria’s Secret Contract that Anticipated a Pandemic, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/business/victorias-secret-sycamore-
coronavirus.html. 
 102.  Verified Compl., SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc., Del. Ch. 2020 (C.A. No. 2020-0297). 
 103.  Id. at 3-4. 
 104.  Id. at 3. 
 105.  SP VS Buyer LP, Transaction Agreement (Exhibit 2.1) (Feb. 20, 2020). The MAE clause 
indicates that a materially adverse event “means any state of facts. . . (i) that would. . . materially impede 
the performance by Parent of its obligations under this Agreement. . . or (ii) that has a material adverse 
effect on the financial condition. . . of the Business, excluding, in the case of clause (ii), any state of facts. 
. . directly or indirectly resulting from. . . pandemics. . .” 
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It may be helpful to treat the MAE clause carveout like a force majeure 
clause and decipher how an Ohio court might construe it in favor of or 
against L Brands if such a case were to be decided under Ohio law. First, 
regarding specificity, Ohio courts defer to the language of the contract to 
determine how narrowly a force majeure clause should be construed. A 
force majeure clause listing a specific set of events will be construed 
narrowly by Ohio courts, while one with broad categories such as “any 
cause not reasonably within the parties’ control” is likely to be construed 
more broadly.106 
If parties in Ohio write contracts after the pandemic and wish for events 
like pandemics, quarantines, and shutdowns to be considered force 
majeure events, then they can best ensure that courts will extend the force 
majeure clause defense to such events by specifying those events within 
the clause. That is the approach recommended by the Thompson Reuters 
Practical Law editors who updated their recommended standard force 
majeure clauses in March 2020 to include “other potential disaster(s) or 
catastrophe(s), such as epidemics, pandemics, or quarantines.”107 Parties 
can choose to make their lists of force majeure events in several different 
ways, but in either case the Practical Law editors recommend specific 
pandemic-inclusive language.108 Clearly, the MAE carveout specifically 
listing “pandemics” in the Victoria’s Secret deal would pass this 
requirement with flying colors.109 
Next, regarding foreseeability, Ohio courts seem to expect parties to 
foresee economic fluctuations and downturns and factor them into 
contract formation as well as the drafting of force majeure clauses.110 For 
example, the court in Stand Energy held a price increase was not a force 
majeure event because price changes ought to be foreseeable by the 
parties at the time of contract formation.111 
Foreseeability may be a sticking point for parties seeking to avoid 
performance. Although the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic is worse than any since the Great Depression, it is nevertheless 
a market fluctuation that Ohio courts would probably deem foreseeable—
at least to an extent—because the economy is always cycling either into 
or away from a downturn. Moreover, many public health experts 
 
 106.  Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Services, Inc., 760 N.E.2d 453, 455 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 107.  General Contract Clauses: Force Majeure (OH), Practical Law Commercial Transactions 
(Mar. 31, 2020). 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  This is particularly true because the drafters specifically included “any state of facts, 
circumstance, condition, event, change, development, occurrence, result or effect to the extent directly or 
indirectly resulting from. . . pandemics. . .” SP VS Buyer LP, supra note 106. 
 110.  In re Millers Cove Energy Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 155, 158 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 111.  Stand Energy, 760 N.E.2d at 457. 
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predicted a catastrophic pandemic throughout the 2010s,112 and such 
experts predicted that the COVID-19 pandemic itself would have dire 
international effects as early as January 2020,113 which may lead an Ohio 
court to deem the pandemic itself to be foreseeable. In other words, the 
attorneys for L Brands may have foreseen the pandemic and resulting 
economic hardship and drafted the February 2020 Transaction Agreement 
accordingly. 
One key difference in the way different jurisdictions analyze force 
majeure clauses is whether the event must render performance actually 
impossible or merely impracticable. In Ohio, a force majeure clause 
cannot excuse nonperformance merely because performance became 
difficult, burdensome, or economically disadvantageous, but the standard 
does not seem to rise to actual impossibility.114 However, just how 
difficult contract performance must be in order to satisfy force majeure 
has not been developed in Ohio case law. 
This ambiguity may be a critical sticking point with courts trying to 
interpret force majeure clauses during COVID-19, and the answer may 
come down to timing. In March and April of 2020, the Ohio state 
government shut down all nonessential businesses115 and issued a stay-at-
home order for all nonessential workers and activities. During that time, 
many parties may have found that performance of contractual obligations 
might have risen to very near the level of impossibility such that a force 
majeure contract would excuse nonperformance. However, in the month 
of May and thereafter, the state government gradually allowed these 
nonessential businesses and activities to resume with strict public health 
limitations.116 It is not clear whether mandates like capacity limitations, 
social distancing, mask-wearing, and sanitization, or even the extreme 
economic downturn, would be considered valid excuses for 
nonperformance under a force majeure clause in Ohio. In any case, in the 
 
 112.  Dana Vigue, Experts Predicted a Coronavirus Pandemic Years Ago. Now It’s Playing Out 
Before Our Eyes, CNN (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/08/health/coronavirus-pandemic-
training-scenario/index.html. 
 113.  Erin Schumaker, Timeline: How Coronavirus Got Started, ABC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2020), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/timeline-coronavirus-started/story?id=69435165. 
 114.  United Gulf Marine, LLC v. Continental Refining Co., No. CV 2017 0040, 2018 WL 
10036528 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Feb. 27, 2018). 
 115.  Essential businesses in Ohio include stores that sell groceries and medicine, food and beverage 
production and agriculture, charitable and social services, religious entities, media, gas and transportation 
businesses, financial institutions, hardware and supply store, certain critical trades, mail and shipping, 
educational institutions, laundry services, home-based care, residential facilities, professional services, 
manufacture and supply chain for certain critical products and industries, and funeral services. See 
Director’s Stay At Home Order, OHIO DEP’T OF HEALTH (Mar. 22, 2020), 
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/static/DirectorsOrderStayAtHome.pdf. 
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Victoria’s Secret example, L Brands may have been able to argue that 
performance in the early months of the pandemic was actually impossible 
due to government orders causing an extreme contraction in the retail 
sector,117 which would have potentially helped its case. 
Finally, regarding control of the nonperforming party, in order to 
successfully use a contract’s force majeure clause as a defense for 
nonperformance, the nonperforming party must prove that the force 
majeure event in question was beyond its control and occurred without its 
fault or negligence.118 This seems like an area in which the party seeking 
nonperformance of contractual obligations would prevail. The trifecta of 
issues surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic—the economic recession, 
the government shutdowns and mandates, and the deadly virus itself—
would probably not be considered the result of the fault or negligence of 
any party to a contract, unless one of those parties is the government itself. 
In the Victoria’s Secret example, the pandemic and subsequent recession 
were certainly none of the parties’ fault, so this requirement would likely 
be satisfied in that case. 
As shown above, L Brands was very lucky to have good legal 
representation in the dealmaking process—ensuring that the MAE clause 
carved out specific foreseeable events—meaning its force majeure 
provision would likely carry significant weight under Ohio law.119 
2. Vis Major 
Vis major is more limited than its common law defense analogue force 
majeure. First, Ohio courts will only allow a vis major defense if the event 
in question is purely natural, meaning it occurs without human cause or 
intervention.120 Second, the vis major event must be truly out of the 
ordinary.121 Third, the vis major event must render performance 
absolutely impossible.122 
The first and second criteria seem like they would be relatively easy to 
prove to an Ohio court. First, as a virus, COVID-19 is natural on its face 
 
 117.  NEW YORK TIMES, supra note 20. 
 118.  Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Services, Inc., 760 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 119.  The case did not move forward in Delaware, so it is unclear how the Delaware courts would 
have interpreted the Transaction Agreement. As it was, the case settled, and both parties got away with 
not paying a termination fee. Jenna Greene, Clean Break: Kirkland Client Can Walk Away from $525M 
Victoria’s Secret Deal, LITIGATION DAILY (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.law.com/litigationdaily/2020/05/04/daily-dicta-clean-break-kirkland-client-can-walk-away-
from-525m-victorias-secret-deal. 
 120.  Fiber Crete Constr. Corp. v. L.W.L. G.P., No. 2-86-24, 1987 WL 19038 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 
13, 1987). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  D.J. Lavy Constr. Co. v. Jordan, No. 91CA-12, 1992 WL 79622 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 10, 
1992). 
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and is furthermore thought to be the result of zoonotic transfer from an 
animal rather than laboratory manipulation.123 Second, pandemics on the 
scale of COVID-19, producing deaths in the hundreds of thousands in a 
matter of months, are uncommon in the United States in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries—the last pandemic in the United States on that 
scale was arguably the 1968 flu pandemic.124 
However, impossibility is an incredibly high bar for parties to meet. It 
could perhaps be met if the parties could only perform their contractual 
obligations by breaking state government mandates, as one Ohio Court of 
Appeals allowed in Glickman v. Coakley.125 Otherwise, parties may have 
a very difficult time proving this criterion. For instance, if the Victoria’s 
Secret case was heard in Ohio courts, and L Brands had not included the 
pandemic carveout in the MAE clause, they would have had to argue that 
negative economic conditions rose to the level of actual impossibility—a 
very difficult task, which probably could only have been sustained by 
invoking the government order shutting down nonessential businesses in 
March and April. 
3. Impossibility and Impracticability 
Under Ohio law, impossibility is a valid defense for nonperformance 
if, after the contract is entered into, an unforeseeable event arises, 
rendering performance by one of the parties impossible.126 However, 
performance is not excused merely because performance is difficult, 
dangerous, or onerous.127 On the other hand, to successfully invoke the 
affirmative defense of impracticability, the nonperforming party must 
show that a supervening event occurred, the non-occurrence of which was 
a basic assumption on which the contract was made, and rendered 
performance impracticable (rather than impossible).128 Ohio courts are 
split as to whether unforeseeability is a prerequisite for impracticability, 
as it is for impossibility. 
Parties might be able to argue that performance was actually 
impossible (rather than merely impracticable) in Ohio during March and 
April 2020, when the state government ordered a shutdown of all 
 
 123.  Kristian G. Anderen et al., The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2, 26 NATURE MEDICINE 4 
(Mar. 17, 2020). 
 124.  Michael S. Rosenwald, History’s Deadliest Pandemics, from Ancient Rome to Modern 
America, WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/local/retropolis/coronavirus-deadliest-pandemics. 
 125.  Glickman v. Coakley, 488 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
 126.  Truetried Service Co. v. Hager, 691 N.E.2d 1112, 1118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
 127.  State ex rel. Jewett v. Sayre, 109 N.E. 636, 639 (Ohio 1914). 
 128.  Bank One, Marion v. Marion, Ohio, Internal Medicine Inc., No. 9-96-69, 1997 WL 176140 
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1997). 
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nonessential businesses and activities, because many parties would have 
been completely unable to operate.129 However, in May and afterwards, 
nonessential businesses began resuming their normal activities, but did so 
in a strongly regulated manner—with masks and social distancing, to 
name a couple such regulations130—and with an increasingly unstable 
workforce and customer base due to layoffs and illness. At that point, 
Ohio courts would probably not consider performance actually 
impossible because businesses could conduct many of their normal 
activities, just in a very limited way. Therefore, after May 2020, parties 
would likely be more successful using the defense of impracticability than 
impossibility. 
To assert an impracticability defense, the party seeking an excuse for 
nonperformance would have to first show that a supervening event 
occurred. This would be simple enough, as the COVID-19 pandemic has 
been extremely well-documented. Next, the party would have to prove 
that the non-occurrence of the pandemic was a basic assumption on which 
the contract was made. This criterion is a bit trickier, because one has to 
judge whether either party assumed the risk of the event occurring.131 
Thus, an unforeseeable event would probably suggest that its non-
occurrence was a basic assumption upon which the contract was made.132 
Other factors highlighted by the Restatement are the relative bargaining 
power of the two parties and the effectiveness of the market in spreading 
the risks at issue.133 
So, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is likely that neither 
party would have assumed the risk of Ohio’s stay-at-home order and 
global pandemic, as no such incident has occurred in any living person’s 
lifetime, although one or more parties may have assumed the risk of a 
recession. If one or more parties are legally sophisticated and 
economically powerful entities (for example, L Brands and Sycamore 
Partners in the Victoria’s Secret deal) but did not include a force majeure 
clause to mitigate risk, then some courts may be less likely to hold that 
impracticability has been satisfied in the case.134 Last, the risks at issue 
have not been spread evenly by the market thus far in 2020, with vastly 
different impacts on groups of different socioeconomic classes,135 which 
 
 129.  OHIO DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 17. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
 132.  Id. at CH. 11, INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  J. Denmon Sigler & Scott Shelton, “Could the Parties Have Anticipated the Unthinkable?” 
Force Majeure in the Texas Energy Industry after COVID-19, TEXAS LAWBOOK (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://texaslawbook.net/could-the-parties-have-anticipated-the-unthinkable-force-majeure-in-the-texas-
energy-industry-after-covid-19. 
 135.  Bauer, supra note 6. 
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could impact a court’s determination of whether the pandemic was an 
event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption upon which the 
contract was made, depending on who the parties are. 
Finally, the party would have to show that COVID-19 made 
performance impracticable. Again, how impracticable performance might 
be for any given business during the pandemic would probably be 
strongly dependent on the time when performance was supposed to occur, 
the essential or nonessential nature of the business, and the economic 
power of the business prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
B. Normative Shifts in Ohio Contract Law During and After COVID-19 
This Comment has thus far described contract provisions and defenses 
during COVID-19 descriptively rather than normatively. Because this is 
an emerging area of the law and the economy, where courts, businesses, 
government entities, and individual people are scrambling to respond and 
build a new normal, Ohio courts need to establish a description of the law 
as it is. 
However, jurists in Ohio should also take this crisis as an opportunity 
to consider how the law ought to be. Who benefits and who loses under 
the law as it is written? Who are the parties who most desperately need a 
win in 2020? And how can Ohio courts shape common law to help make 
the economy and society whole? L Brands may have been able to get off 
relatively easily, but what about a smaller seller with less sophisticated 
legal counsel? 
None of the aforementioned contract principles make it easy for parties 
to escape performance of their contractual obligations. Each of them has 
sticking points around foreseeability as well as the impossibility and 
impracticability standards. But as the Restatement authors wrote, 
“[c]ontract liability is strict liability.”136 In a normal and ideal world, that 
is probably for the best. It ensures that parties take the utmost care before 
they enter into a contract and in return gain the flexibility to provide for 
mutually favorable terms within the scope of an individual transaction or 
relationship. If a party breaches a contract, it does so because, under 
efficient breach theory, it would make them better off and the opposing 
party no worse off. 
However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, neither Ohio nor any other 
jurisdiction in the United States is normal or ideal, and it is difficult to 
expect parties to act rationally under such circumstances. While the 
CARES Act and the Paycheck Protection Program saw Congress 
 
 136.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, CH. 11, INTRODUCTORY NOTE (AM. LAW. INST. 
1981). 
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attempting to bolster small businesses back in March, further federal relief 
was not forthcoming for the remainder of 2020.137 Small companies and 
individual people have unquestionably borne the burden of this, with 
smaller firms laying off more people than larger ones, only 14 percent of 
small businesses receiving Paycheck Protection Program loans, and at 
least 2 percent of small businesses shutting permanently.138 This will 
almost certainly lead to failures of contract performance between 
manufacturers, suppliers, and retailers on a massive scale. These parties 
may or may not be able to evade litigation, an extremely time-consuming 
and expensive endeavor, without financial ruination. 
Ohio courts should proceed with some grace for parties on both sides 
of this matter and for the economic and legal system as a whole. This is 
where law and economics principles, particularly the least-cost avoider 
and opportunism, could be instructive. 
One way courts could assess breaches of contract would be to adopt 
the principle of the least cost avoider for contract cases arising from the 
COVID-19 pandemic. After all, the least cost avoider, or cheapest cost 
avoider, is a well-established principle in tort liability.139 However, it is 
less commonly applied in contract law, though such applications are not 
unheard of.140 The least cost avoider principle holds that whoever has the 
lowest cost of avoiding harm, whether by prevention, mitigation, or 
insurance, should generally be assigned liability when that harm 
occurs.141 This is a particularly appealing framework when both parties 
are faultless,142 as the parties struggling over performance or 
nonperformance during a global pandemic would both likely be. 
Redrawn for the contracts context, courts could construe the least cost 
avoider as the drafter, who can avoid mistakes by exercising greater care 
in drafting contracts.143 Courts could also make judgments specific to the 
type of contract and parties involved. For instance, in a franchisee-
franchisor relationship, the franchisor might be the least cost avoider, as 
it would be in a better position to identify and spread risks to the economic 
 
137.  JORDAIN CARNEY, CORONAVIRUS RELIEF AT A STANDSTILL WITH NO LEADERSHIP-LEVEL TALKS, 
THE HILL (NOV. 18, 2020), HTTPS://THEHILL.COM/HOMENEWS/SENATE/526509-CORONAVIRUS-
RELIEF-AT-A-STANDSTILL-WITH-NO-LEADERSHIP-LEVEL-TALKS. 
 138.  Heather Long, Small Business Used to Define America’s Economy. The Pandemic Could 
Change That Forever, WASHINGTON POST (May 12, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/12/small-business-used-define-americas-economy-
pandemic-could-end-that-forever. 
 139.  See Holtz v. J.J.B. Hilliard W.L. Lyons, Inc., 185 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 140.  Cohen, supra note 91. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. v. Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, 5 F.3d 554 
(D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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health of its products.144 Generally, in a contractual dispute with two 
relatively faultless parties, the least cost avoider will be the more 
economically and legally sophisticated entity. In a dispute between a more 
sophisticated party and a less sophisticated party arising from the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the more sophisticated party may be more 
financially solvent and better able to shoulder a late delivery of goods or 
late payments on a loan or mortgage—to name a few ways this could play 
out in court. 
Another law and economics concept Ohio courts might choose to apply 
in the COVID-19 pandemic context is opportunism, where courts would 
attempt to punish a party that tries to take advantage of another party’s 
information asymmetry or sunk costs. Unlike the least-cost avoider, this 
concept could be used to the benefit of both highly sophisticated and less 
sophisticated parties. For instance, in a loan transaction, a borrower may 
have limited information on what he is entitled to from the Paycheck 
Protection Program, and a court might attempt to incentivize the lender to 
act fairly notwithstanding the borrower’s lack of knowledge. 
In the area of employment law, employers often sink relatively large 
resources into recruiting and training new employees145 and count on 
employees to not take advantage of these sunk resources by taking the 
training and transferring to another position. Although the COVID-19 
pandemic has caused widespread unemployment, there are certain 
sectors, like healthcare, where workers are scarce.146 It would be 
opportunistic behavior—and likely a breach of contract—for a doctor or 
nurse to receive training at one hospital and then attempt to move to 
another one that might pay more. Courts could attempt to dissuade this 
kind of opportunistic behavior as well. 
Of course, Ohio courts may not want to apply such principles in every 
breach of contract matter, or for all eternity, even after the COVID-19 
pandemic has ended. However, innovative legal concepts like those 
proposed in this Section may give parties that are already struggling due 
to the pandemic some much-needed relief. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts will need to develop good principles of contract interpretation, 
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because the effects of COVID-19 will outlive the virus itself. Even with 
vaccines approved for distribution in December 2020, COVID-19 will not 
disappear overnight. After vaccination, individuals would still need to 
engage in social distancing, likely for much of 2021.147 The most 
optimistic scenario seems to place the reemergence of normal non-
pandemic life at the end of 2021 or beginning of 2022.148 Until then, 
Americans and Ohioans will continue to get sick and die, and the 
economy will probably continue to suffer from the lockdowns and the 
public health crisis. 
Furthermore, even when COVID-19 is in society’s rearview mirror, 
other deadly pandemics are likely to arise.149 Even without an epidemic 
or pandemic in the United States, the economy will fluctuate in its regular 
boom and bust cycles. All of this is not meant to catastrophize but rather 
contextualize the importance of understanding how Ohio courts apply 
contract law. Disasters, large and small, individual and societal, will 
always occur, and these disasters will cause (whether indirectly or 
directly) parties to breach the contracts they make in more halcyon times. 
This will require parties to understand how best to draft force majeure 
clauses in their contracts, and how to invoke contract defenses if these 
clauses fail to protect them. It is also an opportunity for Ohio courts to 
better develop their contract law jurisprudence, incorporating behavioral 
economics principles to adequately allocate risks in good times and bad. 
Developing laws that are both flexible enough, so that parties already 
struggling do not go further underwater, and sensible enough, so that 
parties can foresee their results at the outset of contract formation, will 
ensure that Ohio courts can stabilize the state economy at any given point. 
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